For more than a century, the idea of democracy has meant a liberal democracy, where we vote for our leaders and our government rests on a defining document such as the US Constitution. In a liberal democracy, there is also a separation of powers between the different branches of our representative government and rule of law.
However, this is not the only way in which democratic governance can be understood and lately we have been drifting away from that ideal.
In countries such as Turkey, Russia and Hungary, for example, authoritarian leaders have been elected by a large majority and have shown growth contempt for the norms of a liberal democracy. Despite these leaders’ claims to uphold democracy and democratic ideology, they routinely ignore attempts to curtail their power and pressure independent media outlets to limit the public’s understanding of their decision-making. But for the most part, these leaders regularly seek and obtain public approval for their plans through popular vote. For example, in Turkey despite economic setbacks and what many people call an insufficient response until a catastrophic earthquake, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is silent running a tight race against Kemal Kilicdaroglu. represent these countries illiberal democracieswhere power is concentrated in the executive branch of government, while the checks and balances of other branches are absent or severely weakened.
While the liberal aspects of democracy are disappearing in many Eastern European and South Asian countries, relevance of the democratic vote fades into those where their ideals first took root. On both sides of the Atlantic, people who live in traditionally liberal democracies are unhappy. They feel that their voices don’t matter and that politicians are ignoring the issues that matter most to them. In a global economy regulated by conventions, rules and supranational institutions, the room for democratic deliberation shrinking at the national level. This disconnect fuels culture wars that permeate everyday life in so many Western countries, and those culture wars lead to further erosion of liberal democracy. Like climate change, our societies are becoming hotter, more reactive and less stable.
If it is too late to turn back the clock to legislators focusing on policy-making and more moderate executive decision-making, then the idea of democracy will have to adapt to citizens’ demands. Otherwise we will see the collapse of the societies we have built.
The shift in the foundation of citizen-driven governance in the West began in the post-Cold War years. At that time, the leaders of democratic nations initiated a seemingly irreversible process of delegating power to external rules and autonomous technocratic agencies, such as the many agencies of the European Union developed in response to the deepening of the internal market in the 1990s . It was as if the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the ideological confrontation that accompanied it, had freed our leaders from much of the political responsibilities to their constituents. This process was democratic only in name, in that democratically elected politicians were responsible for the decisions, but they rarely campaigned for it explicitly in the face of a general lack of interest in these seemingly mundane procedures of public administration in times of economic boom led by of private sector spending and private sector employment.
In the case of European integration, this phenomenon is labeled “permissive consensus”, was best described by former EU Commissioner Pascal Lamy as “the people were not willing to agree to integration, so you had to move on without telling them too much about what was happening.” Meanwhile, EU-wide regulations, fiscal rules and a common monetary policy imply that economic policy is increasingly being made in Brussels and Frankfurt, by bodies not accountable to the citizenry, while politics remains entrenched in the absence of true political integration. in the national capitals.
At the global level, power distance is nowhere more apparent than in the decision to replace the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. -related intellectual property rights with strict patent and copyright rules that severely limited the scope for antitrust policies. They accepted the establishment of international investor tribunals that, in particular, reduced their margin to implement policies that could affect the profits of multinational companies. And more generally, they have left a significant share of domestic policy responsibilities in trade, technology and investment to external rules. The crux was the exclusion of important issues from the political agenda in many Western democracies, resulting in a real democratic decline.
The end result of this is the spread of populist ideas in Western countries by politicians trying to curry favor with the disillusioned masses that the decision making of some of their predecessors caused. Brexit is the perfect example of this, as the disgruntled among British voters were seduced by the idea of regaining control over policy decisions beyond their power and the prerogative of Community institutions. At the same time, national governments’ loss of authority over economic policies forced politicians to campaign on non-economic wedge issues based on values, morality, and lifestyle, which became increasingly prominent in the public debate. It is a sense of violation of these core values that fuels culture wars, and it is the centrality acquired by non-economic fault lines in public discourse that explains their emergence after the turn of the millennium.
Culture wars are not new in the US. In the 1960s, religious conservatives and liberals—as well as nonbelievers—weredivided into attitudes towards social and racial justice, religion and science. These divisions, rooted in deep differences of opinion based on culture and beliefs, have largely endured. However, cultural differences are have risen today an unprecedented role in public discourse, and the January 6 invasion of Capitol Hill by a pro-Trump mob exemplifies the mutual resentment among Americans.
The ideological division over vaccination during the COVID emergency illustrates the political relevance that non-economic wedge issues are beginning to carry. During the first cycles of the US vaccination campaign, almost every blue state achieved a higher vaccination rate than almost every red state, in the midst of political interference and attempts to manipulating people.
Social media are closely linked with the spread of these and other divisive ideas. Their algorithms deliberately amplify dangerous disinformation and privilege the most divisive content posted on the network, as this content is more likely to be shared by users and brought to the fore, it maximizes platform traffic and revenue, but inevitably leads to further division. This modus operandi, which was denounced by Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugengenerates perverse incentives, driving even relatively moderate users to hone and polarize their content to gain visibility, ultimately fueling anger and distrust in institutions.
Reconciling liberalism and democracy is the challenge ahead. “Softening” the effects of the sensational changes in the functioning of our democracies that have taken place in just a few years, and returning power to the people through the bodies they choose, would be the best solution, but this requires a institutional transformation on a scale that is difficult to frame in today’s fragmented societies. And it is a step that no country could take alone.
The only way forward, at least in the short term, is to “adapt” our democracies to the new circumstances, and to restore full autonomy to elected governments, at least in a few critical areas, such as industrial and innovation policy. This would give our governments more freedom to experiment in economic policy, which is vital to accommodate it multiple economic and non-economic shocks characteristic of our turbulent times. At the same time, democratically elected leaders should try to establish a policy framework more rooted in production and job creation. Only a framework explicitly designed to create jobs, raise wages and reduce inequalities that contribute to the overheating of our societies would reduce discontent, bring citizens closer to institutions and help preserve our model of democratic living together.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
This is an opinion and analysis article and the views of the author or authors are not necessarily those of Scientific American.